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Since, in general, non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned, any eavesdropping attempt in a Quan-
tum Communication scheme using non-orthogonal states as carriers of information introduces some
errors in the transmission, leading to the possibility of detecting the spy. Usually, orthogonal states
are not used in Quantum Cryptography schemes since they can be faithfully cloned without altering
the transmitted data. Nevertheless, L. Goldberg and L. Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Lett. 75 (1995) 1239]
proposed a protocol in which, even if the data exchange is realized using two orthogonal states,
any attempt to eavesdrop is detectable by the legal users. In this scheme the orthogonal states are
superpositions of two localized wave packets travelling along separate channels. Here we present an
experiment realizing this scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex, 42.50.St
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for
transmitting a secret key between two partners (usually
named Alice and Bob) by exploiting quantum properties
of light. The most important characteristic of this idea
is that the secrecy of the generated key is guaranteed by
the very laws of nature, i.e. by the properties of quan-
tum states [1]. In the last decade QKD has abandoned
the laboratories becoming a mature technology for com-
mercialization [2]; communications over more thane 100
km having been achieved both in fiber [3] and open air
[4].
Various protocols for realising QKD have been sug-
gested [1], such as BB84 [5], B92 [6], Ekert [7]. All of
them are based on the use of non-orthogonal states, a
condition that was considered necessary for guaranteeing
security, up to a paper of Goldenberg and Vaidman (GV)
[8]. In that work was presented for the first time a scheme
for realising a QKD protocol based on orthogonal states,
whose security was based on two ingredients. First, the
orthogonal states sent by Alice were superposition of two
localised wave packets that were not sent simultaneously
to Bob. Second, the transmission time of the photons
was random.
This scheme, beyond its interest for application, has
also a large conceptual interest for understanding the
quantum resources/properties needed for QKD. Never-
theless, up to now, no experimental realization was still
done. Purpose of this letter is to present its first experi-
mental implementation.
In the theoretical proposal of Ref.[8], the orthogonal
states sent by Alice are the superpositions of two local-
ized wave-packets. Those are not sent simultaneously to
Bob, but separated by a fixed delay. In this case there
is a direct correspondence between the state prepared by
Alice and the bit received by Bob, for instance,
0 → |Ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉+ |b〉)
1 → |Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉 − |b〉),
where |a〉 and |b〉 are two localized wave–packets and the
states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 are orthogonal. The states |Ψ0〉 and
|Ψ1〉 are emitted randomly in time, and the presence of
an eventual eavesdropper can be detected by legitimate
users exploiting the information on the detection times
[8]. The scheme works as follows: Alice sends Bob ei-
ther |Ψ0〉 or |Ψ1〉. The launch on the quantum channel
of the wave-packet |b〉 is delayed for some amount of time
τ with respect to the launch of wave-packet |a〉. τ could
be chosen larger than the traveling time T of photons
between Alice’s and Bob’s locations. As |b〉 will travel
through the quantum channel only after the wave-packet
|a〉 has already reached Bob’s location, both packets are
never simultaneously present in the quantum channels.
Furthermore, as pointed out in Ref. [8], the requirement
of τ greater than the traveling time T is not strictly nec-
essary. Indeed the security of the protocol is ensured
even if τ is only greater than the overall uncertainty in
the measurement of the transmission/detection times ts
and tr [8].
In our proof-of-principle experiment this is obtained
exploiting a balanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer
(MZI) with two equal optical delays OD1 and OD2. Ac-
cording to Fig. 1, sources of single photon S0 and S1
at the two input ports of the beam splitter on Alice side
provide single photons propagating in the transmission
channel in the state |Ψ0〉 or |Ψ1〉 respectively. The emis-
sion time of the single photon in one of the two state is
random, but it is registered by Alice.
As the packet |b〉 is stored in OD1, wave-packet |a〉
travels from Alice’s to Bob’s site along the upper chan-
nel and enters in OD2, where it is delayed until also |b〉
reaches Bob’s site. In this way the two packets interfere
as they simultaneously arrive to the second beam-splitter,
thus, the click of detector Di deterministically implies
that the single photon state was in the state |Ψi〉, i.e. it
was sent by source Si. Two security tests are performed
by Alice and Bob to highlight the possible presence of
an eavesdropper. The first one is a public comparison




















2FIG. 1: Experimental set-up. Two single photon sources
(S0, S1, realized exploiting an heralded single photon source
based on parametric down-conversion (PDC) obtained by
pumping with a 406 nm CW laser beam a type I BBO crystal)
are injected in the MZI, one at the time. Alice’s site is com-
posed by the two single photon sources and the first optical
delay (OD1). Bob’s site is composed by the second optical
delay (OD2, identical to OD1) and the two single photon de-
tectors (D0, D1).
for each photon. If we assume that the traveling time
between the two parties is T , only the events detected at
time tr = ts+τ+T are considered as part of the message,
while all the others highlight the presence of Eve. The
second one is the comparison of corresponding portions of
the legitimate users’ bit strings to estimate the quantum
bit error rate (QBER). We underline that in the ideal
case discrepancies in the transmission/detection times or
in the bit strings can only be induced by an eavesdropper.
Let us mention for the sake of completeness that it was
argued by Peres[9] that this protocol introduced no nov-
elty with respect to BB84. To this claim GV replied that
while in other protocols like BB84 the security is guaran-
teed by nonorthogonality, in GV protocol it is based on
causality, since they proved that a successful eavesdrop-
ping would require superluminal signaling [8]. Further-
more, while all cryptographic schemes require two steps
for sending information (sending the quantum object and
then some classical information), in GV protocol only the
first step is needed for communication, the second step is
used only for assuring security against eavesdropping.
Fig.1 shows the setup of the experiment representing
the first realization of the GV protocol. The single pho-
ton states are obtained exploiting an heralded single pho-
ton source based on parametric down-conversion (PDC)
[11]. A CW 100 mW Coherent Cube diode laser sys-
tem at 406 nm is used to pump a BBO type I crystal.
PDC photons pairs at degeneracy (812 nm) are emitted
in slightly non-collinear regime (three degrees with re-
spect to the pump direction). The heralding photons are
selected by means of 1 nm bandwidth interference fil-
ters, collected in a multimode optical fiber and detected
by Single Photon Avalanche Photo-diodes (SPAD) de-
tectors. The heralded single photon, the carrier of the
information to be exchanged between the legitimate par-
ties, is collected in a single mode optical fibre (a 10 nm
interference filter is placed on the heralding arm only
for background suppression). The CW laser operation
ensures the generation of photon pairs at random time,
and the detection of one photon of the pair in the herald-
ing arm provides the temporal information on the emis-
sion of the single-photon as requested by the GV pro-
tocol. With the aim of realizing the proof-of-principle
QKD scheme proposed by GV, Alice sends bit 0 or 1
by addressing the encoding photon to the proper input
port of the first beam-splitter. Bob detect the single pho-
tons at the output of the interferometer. The balanced
MZI contains both the optical delays and the transmis-
sion channel from Alice to Bob. In particular, after the
input BS at the Alice side one arm of the interferome-
ter contains a delay line (realized through a trombone
prism), while on the other arm the delay line (again
based on a trombone prism) is located on Bob’s side.
The positions of the trombones in the optical delays are
adjusted via a closed loop piezo-movement system with
nano-metric resolution. Detection events after the out-
put BS of the interferometer are obtained by SPAD de-
tectors operating in Geiger mode. The electronics high-
lighting the presence of coincident detections is based,
as usual, on Time-to-Amplitude-Converter and Multi-
Channel-Analyser. Specifically, in our case the temporal
condition for the security of the QKD scheme is satis-
fied as the jitter of our detectors (corresponding to the
uncertainty in the determination of the of the transmis-
sion/detection times) is about 300 ps, while the length
of the delay lines is 60 cm corresponding to a storage
time of ∼2 ns. The stability of the interferometer has
been tested by scanning the position of Alice’s trombone
prism with Bob’s one kept at a fixed position. Fig. 2
shows the interference fringes of heralded counts and the
visibilities (V) are well above 80%, irrespective of which
port of the input beam splitter is used to inject the single
photon in the interferometer.
The quality of the transmission is quantified by the




where PRight (PWrong) is the probability for Bob to re-
ceive a bit value which is equal to (different from) the one
sent by Alice), measured to be 7%, according to Table I.
In conclusion, we have realized the first proof-of-
principle experimental implementation of QKD based on
orthogonal states (GV protocol) [8]. Our results demon-
strate the possibility of achieving a secure QKD trans-
mission with orthogonal state and therefore provides a
significant hint to the discussion on the minimal quantum
resources necessary for the implementation of quantum
tasks overcoming classical limits.
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3FIG. 2: Number of detected events per second at detector D0
and D1 as a function of the path length difference ∆l between
the two arms of the interferometer for source S0 (top picture)
and S1 (bottom). As expected, the phase shifts between D0
and D1 sine fits of the coincidence counts are consistent with
pi.
VD0 VD1 QBER
S0 (89± 1)% (82± 1)% (7.0± 1.6)%
S1 (88± 1)% (85± 1)% (7.1± 1.4)%
TABLE I: Main results obtained in the implementation of the
QKD protocol proposed in Ref. [8]. VD0, VD1 are the visibil-
ities of the interference fringes observed at the two outputs
of the interferometer by scanning the path length difference,
QBER is the estimated quantum bit error rate for the trans-
mission.
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